

**JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTERS:  
IMPROVING SUPPORT TO WARFIGHTERS BELOW  
THE JOINT TASK FORCE (JTF) LEVEL**

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## **Joint Intelligence Centers: Improving Support To Warfighters Below the JTF Level**

### **ABSTRACT**

Supporting military operations or supporting the warfighter has become one of the intelligence community's primary goals. The move towards "joint warfighting" in the late 1980s, in addition to the reduction of available funds, prompted the Secretary of Defense to de-emphasize Service-level intelligence and establish the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) as the primary organization to support joint warfighters at all levels of command. This concept involves the entire intelligence community. Within the intelligence community, the JIC acts as the central clearing house which fuses common data from all component, theater and national resources.

Many senior military officers believe that the poor relationship between intelligence providers and the warfighter is the biggest problem the intelligence community faces today. Through the above efforts and initiatives, the intelligence community has made great strides in improving support to the warfighter. Most changes to date, however, only improve support to warfighters at the theater and joint task force (JTF) levels. JICs can improve the relationship with warfighters below the JTF level. JICs can create the dynamic interaction needed to provide proactive, usable intelligence and create a better understanding of producer-consumer requirements in peacetime and in crisis.

A comparative analysis of different alternatives developed by researching possible improvements to JIC support to warfighters below the JTF level is the focus of

this study. These alternatives were analyzed using the "Model of Choice" method. This framework for analysis requires specific criteria in order to value the outcomes and the measure the success of each alternative. The criteria referenced require that the alternatives improve the JIC relationship with warfighters below the JTF level. The same criteria also require that this relationship provide proactive intelligence and that the intelligence provided is in a usable format to tactical units.

The concept of Operator-Intelligence teams meets the criteria established for success. These teams would consist of operators and intelligence professionals working together at the theater JICs. Intelligence personnel would bring knowledge and experience gained in the intelligence community, while the operators would bring direct knowledge of the mission and close contact with the customers. The Operator-Intelligence team concept is not new. Strike Projection Evaluation and Anti-Air Research (SPEAR) is an Operator-Intelligence team that consists of operators as well as military and civilian intelligence personnel tasked to support Navy staffs and tactical units. SPEAR fulfills its role through personal knowledge of the mission, integration with national level intelligence organizations, up-close and personal contact with the customer, and aggressive dissemination of information to the warfighter. This type of support gained SPEAR critical acclaim from combat units during operation Desert Storm.

Establishing Operator-Intelligence Teams at the theater JICs would be a new way of providing support to the warfighters. These teams would allow the JICs to create the

dynamic interaction with the warfighters below the JTF level while providing proactive, usable intelligence to the deployed forces.

## **IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE WARFIGHTER**

### **Support To Military Operations**

The fall of the Soviet Union combined with Desert Storm and the evolution of "Jointness" throughout the military establishment has brought about dramatic changes in the way the intelligence community as a whole conducts its business, especially its support to military operations. For the sake of clarity a few words of definition are necessary. The term intelligence community usually refers to the national intelligence agencies such as National Security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the intelligence division of the Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), Central Imaging Office (CIO), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), etc. The term defense intelligence usually includes intelligence from DIA, theater Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs), Service intelligence organizations such as the Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) which is an Army organization, and the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) which is a Navy organization, as well as tactical intelligence from combat units. For the purposes of this paper, the term intelligence community is defined as all of the intelligence sources and organizations collectively because, in the 1990s, all are involved with support to the warfighter.

This does not imply that the intelligence community did not support military operations in the past, but the current environment has placed more emphasis on supporting military operations or supporting the warfighter. The term warfighter is very broad and variously defined. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Of Staff is a warfighter. A theater CINC is a warfighter. These individuals make combat decisions, but they do not actually do any fighting. In this paper the terms operator or warfighter are defined as an infantry, artillery, or armored commander, aircrew, ship's captain or Special Forces unit participating in military operations. In basic terms, warfighters are the forces deployed who are "pulling the triggers", "down in the trenches", actually fighting. Intelligence support to military operations is intelligence support to these deployed forces. 1

### **Strengthening Defense Intelligence**

The changes in Defense intelligence began with the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act in 1986. This act not only created Theater Combatant Commands, it forced the Department of Defense to rethink its intelligence infrastructure. The move toward "joint warfighting" added to the reduction of available funds prompted the Secretary of Defense to de-emphasize service-level intelligence. In 1991, in a memorandum entitled "Strengthening Defense Intelligence," the Secretary of Defense established the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) as the primary organization to support joint warfighters at all levels. 2 This support was to be primarily at the operational and tactical level. In 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's view of supporting warfighters with fewer resources was also noted in the "Bottom Up Review." He stated that, "Total U.S. intelligence and surveillance capability will be less than it was during the Cold War, but

it will be better able to provide timely information to battlefield commanders." 3 Yet despite the theoretical preparations and high-level support for increasing usability of intelligence for the battlefield commanders, there were significant difficulties in practice. Desert Storm, for example, demonstrated that the JIC could not provide allof the intelligence support to fulfill the needs of the warfighters. 4

### **National Community Gets Involved**

To fill in the gaps in JIC coverage and correct problems which developed between theater commanders and the national agencies demonstrated during Desert Storm, Congress directed national-level intelligence agencies to improve their support to operational commanders. For example, the Senate's 1992 National Defense Authorization Act, in an attempt to improve national intelligence systems' and organizations' responsiveness to the needs of the combatant commanders, called on the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to improve its capability to support combatant commands. 5

In 1992, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director, Robert Gates created the Office Of Military Affairs (OMA) at CIA to improve support to military operations. 6 The office provided the DoD a single point of contact within the CIA for all defense intelligence matters. The Joint Chiefs Of Staff (JCS), through Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine For Intelligence Support To Operations, suggested that thefollowing national-level intelligence organizations share intelligence resources, expertise, and intelligence products in support of military operations: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense Mapping Agency

(DMA), the intelligence divisions of the Department of State (Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)) and the military services. 7

In the mid 1990s, the intelligence community continues to focus primarily on support to military operations as required by the President's national security strategy and Presidential Decision Directive-35 (PDD-35). PDD-35 is a document that represents the Administration's highest national security priorities and provides guidance for the intelligence community to focus its effort and manage funding. 8

In the 1995 United States National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement, the President addressed support to military operations as one of the key goals of the defense community despite the much wider range of threats and potential dangers that intelligence must respond to in the post-Cold War era. 9 In addition, the recent Report of the Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community indicated that support to military operations should continue as one of the principal missions of the Intelligence Community. 10

### **JICs: "One Stop Shopping" For Warfighters**

While the emphasis on support to military operations increased at the national level, the Secretary of Defense and Joint Chiefs Of Staff established the JIC concept as the primary means for providing support to warfighters at all levels. It would be unreasonable for warfighters to expect JICs to be able to satisfy all the needs of each unit deployed in theater. However, joint intelligence doctrine delineates the theater JIC as the



central clearing house for fusing common data from all component, theater and national resources. JICs are supposed to receive national level intelligence via the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), in the Pentagon. Under the supervision of DIA, this intelligence architecture should provide the warfighter with "one stop shopping" for his intelligence needs. 11

Through the above efforts and initiatives, the intelligence community has made great strides in improving intelligence support to military operations since the early 1990s. Connectivity and interoperability 12 have improved tremendously through the use of the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS) and the Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS). 13 These systems are the backbone and the common standard of joint communications worldwide. They provide the means for secure transmission of voice, video, graphics and text data near real-time throughout the world. Certainly, technological advancements have made many improvements possible and will continue to revolutionize the way intelligence is processed and disseminated in the twenty-first century. Yet, if "support to the warfighter" continues to head in the direction of technologically oriented changes, the intelligence community runs the risk of having a high level of collection and dissemination capability without the tools for proper analysis and production. 14

The intelligence community already produces more intelligence than its customers consume. Even intelligence that is relevant and well-focused on operational needs does not always get to the people that can use it. 15 The ability to send information



does not solve the problem of support in the absence of a relationship between intelligence producers and their consumers that is needed to convince the customer to use the intelligence that is available or make him aware of its existence. Brig Gen Hayden, USAF, expressed this belief when serving as European Command Director of Intelligence (EUCOM J2): "We can move intelligence at the speed of light around the globe, but the most critical 25 feet in that path is still the distance between the commander's front door and his desk." 16

The House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence expressed this very concern in its Staff Study on Intelligence Support to Military Operations: "Although clearly very important, having the ability to transmit volumes of data in near-real time has greatly overshadowed (in terms of interest and expenditures) the importance of the utility and availability of the information being passed." 17 The Staff Study further illustrates that, "While striving to attain technical solutions, [intelligence producers] must also address the intelligence data/analysis itself, as it, too, is critical to a commander's success." 18

### **Improving JIC Support To The Warfighter**

Having acknowledged the difficulties, what is the key to improving JIC support to the warfighter in the mid-1990s? Many senior military officers and intelligence professionals believe that the poor relationship between intelligence providers and the warfighter is the biggest problem the intelligence community faces today. 19 This inadequate relationship hinders their understanding of each other, perpetuating

misconceptions and exacerbating any problems associated with support. Army Chief of Staff, Gen Reimer, USA, believes that the operators need to understand what intelligence can and can not do for them. 20 Director of Intelligence, Pacific Command, RADM Jacoby, USN, has stated that intelligence support must be based on a "dynamic interaction" between intelligence producers and thewarfighter. 21 Brig Gen Hayden, USAF, Director for Intelligence, European Command goes even further to say that intelligence must become part of the warfight and not just support for the warfighter. 22

As clearly illustrated, senior intelligence professionals do not view technological solutions as the only key to improving support to warfighters in the mid-1990s or 21st century. This is not to say that technological advancements do not improve intelligence support to warfighters. Instead, the positions of the senior officers reflect thoughts on other areas in which intelligence support can be improved.

This thesis will concentrate specifically on how JICs can improve the producer-consumer relationship and create a dynamic interaction resulting in proactive intelligence and a better understanding of producer-consumer requirements in peacetime and in crisis. The thesis will specifically focus on support to operators below the Joint Task Force (JTF) level. 23

### **Plan of the Thesis**

In order to discuss possible ways the JICs can improve support to warfighter, one must have a clear understanding of the JIC structure and functions. In Chapter 2, I will

discuss what a JIC is and what functions it is supposed to perform. I will explain how the JIC concept began and how, theoretically, the entire intelligence community contributes in order for JICs to perform their missions. This full explanation is necessary for the reader to appreciate the monumental task the JICs must accomplish.

In Chapter 3, I will discuss intelligence support to warfighters in the recent past, detailing the types of problems the JICs must face when supporting warfighter.

In Chapter 4, I follow up with changes and improvements in intelligence support to the warfighter that have occurred since the creation of the JICs. Included in this chapter will be an explanation of what JICs are specifically doing to improve the relationship between operators and intelligence providers.

Chapter 5 will identify the shortcomings of current efforts to provide adequate intelligence support below the JTF level. I will illustrate why JICs still have trouble supporting units below this level. I will examine possible solutions to the current shortcomings and how the JICs can improve the relationship with the warfighters and I will look at the benefits and the drawbacks of each solution.

In the final chapter, I will evaluate all of the alternatives in order to draw conclusions about the best course of action for JICs to actually improve their relationship with their consumers, thereby improving intelligence support to subordinate commands below the JTF level in peacetime and crisis.

The regional JIC is the primary source of intelligence for military operations and the warfighter at all levels. Regional JICs are responsible for a designated AOR and forces are assigned under their CINC. They act as a fusion centers and combine information from all service intelligence and national-level agencies as well as deployed units to provide a single point of contact to satisfy the intelligence needs of the warfighter. Regional JICs are responsible for ensuring that information flows to and from operational forces. The theater commander and his senior intelligence officer, the J-2, 26 determine JIC functions and responsibilities. JICs receive specific guidance and direction from the theater J2. The JIC is the principle organization supporting joint operations; therefore, its manning and operations should reflect the mission of the command to which it is assigned. However, all JICs, both regional and functional, perform similar functions.

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## **SUPPORT DURING DESERT STORM**

Before the intelligence community looks at solutions to improve current support, it must first gain a clear understanding of the problems associated with support to the warfighter. In addition, the solution seeker must understand what has been done to date to improve this type of intelligence support. Desert Storm presents myriad examples to illustrate the range of intelligence support problems. The Gulf War's depth and complexity created the greatest demand for U.S. intelligence support to warfighters since the Vietnam War. Typically, a strong demand will expose the vulnerabilities and weaknesses of any system.

## Mixed Views On Support

Intelligence support to Desert Storm has received mixed reviews. In post-war testimony before Congress, Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf stated that while the "intelligence community as a whole did a great job," he felt that he, as a theater commander, was not well served. 55 He was mainly referring to the absence of national intelligence estimates presented in a digestible format, and the wide variation between theater and national reports. 56 At the same time, General Schwarzkopf praised his Central Command (CENTCOM) intelligence staff: "I was blessed with an intelligence staff whose work was so good that the military intelligence community in Washington usually let Central Command take the lead, seconding our assessment of developments in the Middle East." 57

This mixed response also represented the Chairman of the JCS, Gen Colin L. Powell's views. He believed that intelligence support to the warfighter in the Gulf War "...was probably the best in military history." 58 This statement is arguably right on target, yet Gen Powell also addressed his frustration with "...the lack of coordination and timeliness in the dissemination of intelligence collected at the national level." 59

The intention of pointing out the frustration as well as the approbation of the generals of Desert Storm is not to produce an all-inclusive list of intelligence related problems and lessons-learned in Desert Storm. Rather, this chapter attempts to give the reader an understanding of the type of problems specifically associated with intelligence

support to warfighters. In addition, it seeks to demonstrate what JICs have and have not done since Desert Storm to improve this essential support.

### **Passing National Imagery To Operational and Tactical Commanders**

The problems encountered passing national imagery to operational and tactical commanders was a result of Service "stovepipes" which resulted in poor connectivity between services and theater support. 61 Intelligence data could be passed to the theater J-2 in real time or near real time but had to be delivered by courier to other commanders in theater. This problem developed because nine out of the twelve SIDS brought into theater could not talk to each other. In addition, poor resolution on some of the machines made the exchange of usable imagery a difficult task.

SIDS first entered the military in the early 1980s. At the time, the Services discussed problems of interoperability, however, no Service was willing to give up its hardware in favor of connectivity. This stubbornness did not change until the Secretary of Defense gave ASD(C3I) enough power to enforce interoperability which eventually resulted in the Plan For Restructuring Defense Intelligence in 1991. 62

### **Bottlenecks And Not Enough Information**

Bottlenecks within intelligence staffs located in Riyadh also prevented timely dissemination of information down to ground units and air wings. It is important to remember that in Desert Storm more intelligence was sent to the theater of operations than ever before in the history of war. The sheer volume of intelligence may have

overwhelmed CENTCOM intelligence staffs, preventing the flow of information down to operational and tactical units. 63

A research report from the House of Representatives Oversight And Investigations Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee noted that there were numerous complaints from air wing intelligence officers that the Central Command Air Force (CENTAF) intelligence staff in Riyadh failed to pass useful intelligence reports and analyses to their units and felt that CENTAF was hoarding information. 64 CENTAF senior officers in Riyadh believed that the problem was that the junior officers in the field had unrealistic expectations of what intelligence they should be receiving. CENTAF did not have the capability to transmit the volume of data requested by the component units. Further, CENTAF felt that it was the intelligence staff's job at the operational level to prioritize information: "The Riyadh intelligence staffs shared a mind-set that they were better placed than the operators to determine what the operators needed." 65

Limited transmission capability does not explain all of the complaints received from junior officers in combat units. Many Air Force wing intelligence officers reported that the amount of intelligence they received actually decreased after CENTAF was completely operational in Riyadh. The poor relationship between the intelligence staffs in Riyadh and the units caused many gaps in intelligence support as noted in these examples from the House Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, report on Intelligence Successes And Failures In Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM:



..50 imagery overlays were shipped from Washington to Riyadh to be distributed among the air wings, but the warrant officer responsible for their distribution only got five copies; the rest simply disappeared within the headquarters staffs where the displays were found attractive. Repeatedly, CENTAF target planners complained that CENTAF intelligence officers had to be forced into even talking to them and sharing information.

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Targeting materials prepared by 480th Tactical Intelligence Group at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, whose tasking it was to pass materials to fighting units, never made it to squadrons in theater. There were also reports that pilots who were flying SCUD Combat Air Patrols (CAPs) did not receive imagery of their target areas, although photo reconnaissance planes were flying those areas almost every day. The CENTAF intelligence staff's lack of experience in working with the fighting units resulted in inadequate knowledge about the operational mission. The lack of experience and knowledge of the mission prevented the development of the good working relationship between intelligence producers and operators which is critical to useful support. The essential nature of the relationship was commented on by one officer:

When we go into combat, everyone is doing it for the first time. This is why so many units like ours got used to going to TAC [Tactical Air Command] for intel over the years and developed a good relationship with the 480th [which is part of TAC and services tactical flying units in peacetime]. They knew what our needs were, were familiar with the weapon systems and had an appreciation for the support we would need.

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## **The Fire Hose And Information Overload**

Units who complain of not receiving enough information always have been an intelligence challenge, but in Desert Storm some units received too much information. In an attempt to get information to the warfighters quickly, intelligence reports and estimates overloaded the message system. Naval communications in Hawaii had 8,000 "Immediate" messages backed up in their system at one point during the air campaign. 69 Unfortunately, most of the messages were not even pertinent to the consumers immediate concerns and the back up prevented useful intelligence from being passed. Some Marine units in the desert received over 200 messages each day with less than three to five percent of them containing useful information. 70

## **Digestible Intelligence**

In order to be useful to the warfighter the intelligence provider must distill volumes of information into short clear statements in a format that the operator can apply to his mission. Volumes of information are useless if the warfighter can not determine their meaning. General Schwarzkopf complained about two shortcomings in analysis that bothered him during Desert Storm. First, he was often presented with highly technical analyses that were useless to the military commander. For example, General Schwarzkopf was given a report "...of a bridge that was 52 percent destroyed. He wanted to know what that meant. Could tanks cross the bridge? No. Could trucks cross the bridge? No. Then, from an operational military standpoint, the bridge was 100 percent unusable." 75 The technical analysis was misleading and therefore not useful to the troops on the ground.

Second, General Schwarzkopf noted that much of the analysis he received was so heavily caveated that no matter what the outcome was the information would be correct. This type of analysis is not useful to the warfighter. However, analysis, especially predictive analysis, without any caveats could be just as misleading and could cause one to take action based on misleading information. 76

## **Conclusion**

The problems that the intelligence community faced in supporting warfighters during Desert Storm illustrated three recurring themes:

(1) The intelligence community and the warfighters have to be connected, sometimes physically and always electronically. Without proper connectivity and the ability to communicate and pass information, any information itself as well as analysis that is done is useless.

(2) Intelligence staffs and warfighters must have a good working relationship and understand each other's needs as well as limitations. This is necessary to ensure the flow of information, acceptance of the analysis and eliminate unrealistic requests. Critical assessments are useless unless the analyst's judgements are part of the warfighters' decision making process.

(3) Intelligence analysts must have an understanding of what the warfighter needs to know. Information must be presented in a usable format that actually tells the operator something. Intelligence analysts must be able to tell the warfighters what intelligence knows, what it does not know, and how much confidence it has in the assessment based on its sources.

## **IMPROVEMENTS SINCE DESERT STORM**

Since Desert Storm, the intelligence community has made a tremendous effort to improve Intelligence Support to military operations. During that war, the JIC concept was still undergoing development. Theater intelligence had no procedures, nor did they have a very good ability, to incorporate intelligence from national-level sources and pass it to combat units. In response to these challenges, the intelligence community has made several changes in the 1990s to improve support to military operations. Changes, such as the establishment of JICs with common procedures and architectures as well as equipment for passing information, are attempts by the intelligence community to enhance intelligence support to warfighters.

### **Connectivity**

The uncertain ability of the intelligence community to disseminate information properly to consumers was one of the most pressing problems it faced during Desert Storm. Connectivity problems and interoperability of systems contributed a major share to the dissemination problems.<sup>77</sup> Consequently, the intelligence community responded to the challenges by implementing the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications

System (JWICS) and Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) discussed in detail above. RADM Wilson, Director for Intelligence, USACOM, during Operation Uphold Democracy commented that the improvements that these systems made in connectivity was perhaps the most important new tool in the military intelligence effort in Haiti. 78 The improved connectivity also made possible other improvements such as the establishment of a secure internet type system, called INTELINK, and available via JWICS. INTELINK has allowed agencies and other intelligence organizations 24hour access to intelligence products and points of contacts. Because of the INTELINK system, customers are able to access or "pull" information they need instead of having volumes of data sent or "pushed" to them via the more usual routing of the AUTODIN system. 79

### **Common Tactics Techniques And Procedures (TTPs)**

In response the Theater Commands have developed TTPs in order to have a plan for incorporating intelligence from national-level sources and augmenting staffs for crisis support. TTPs act as a "cook book" or step-by-step guide for joint operations, acting as a common reference point providing principles, and procedures for JIC support to JTFs. These documents are currently the only accessible written material providing detailed guidance on intelligence procedures. Due to unique mission and requirements, each theater command TTP is different. There seems to have been a deliberate attempt by the Theater commands to promote individuality and creativity. Nevertheless, TTPs are a useful tools for determining the type of connectivity needed between JICs and other intelligence agencies as well as the amount of augmentation the JIC needs from the component commands and the national level agencies to support JTF operations. 80 This

common guidance is even more useful when JTFs are setup around different services in different locations. For example, eight different JTF intelligence directors (J-2s) for four different JTFs during operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti used ACOM TTPs. The continuous support to operations and smooth transition between the four JTFs were made possible by each JTF JIC using ACOM TTPs. 81

### **Field Support Teams**

In order to provide TTP guidance and training to intelligence staffs, Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) under USACOM established a Field Support Directorate. In addition to developing TTPs for USACOM, the directorate consists of four teams that deploy with JTF staffs during exercises and real world contingencies. The teams are composed of 15 people who are experts in targeting, collection and RFI management, automatic data processing (ADP) systems and communications as well as ground, air and naval order of battle analysis. Field Support Teams provide JTF intelligence staffs with training and assistance in joint intelligence tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for intelligence support to operations. Although these training teams are unique to AIC, EUCOM has used them to assist JTFs within its AOR. 82

JICPAC has similar teams called Intelligence Augmentation Teams (IAT), as part of their Crisis Management Division, that support JTFs. JICPAC also goes one step further than AIC and places Intelligence Support Teams (IST) within each component command so JIC support can reach each component commander. The major difference is that the ACOM Field Support teams can actually become the core intelligence staff of a

JTF JIC while the JICPAC teams only assist the JTF J2 with connectivity and intelligence support from the regional JIC. 83

### **Customer Support Offices**

TTPs and Field Support Teams are designed to improve support to warfighters once a theater CINC has created a JTF. To respond to the intelligence needs of the warfighter during peace time, regional JICs created Customer Support Offices. These offices provide an entry point to the JIC and act as a liaison for its products and services. While all regional JICs have these offices, like most common functions of the JICs, there are subtle differences in the way each JIC provides support. For example, JICPAC's customer support office offers command briefings to deployed units allowing analysts to concentrate on assigned areas and the customers to learn what type of intelligence support that the JIC is capable of producing. 84 Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Molesworth customer support offices sends liaison officers prior to or during transit of combat units into their AOR. 85 Some Customer Support Offices have a representative from each of the military services to include Special Forces. This allows the regional JIC to accommodate requests that are service specific and require more detailed knowledge. 86 When responding to request, these offices ensure that the regional JIC has not already produced the intelligence product needed to answer the request thus preventing duplication of effort. These offices also provide regional JIC intelligence products or direct the question to the appropriate regional JIC analysts. They also can arrange for regional JIC analysts to brief deploying units and provide units with points of contact for



specific intelligence needs. 87 These offices signify a move toward customer service, education, and relating what the regional JIC can do for the unit.

## **Conclusion**

Receiving feedback from the warfighters is not enough to provide the best support possible. A key warfighter-intelligence difficulty is that the warfighter has little knowledge of what they could or should be asking for. If they do not know what is available from the intelligence community, the warfighters cannot evaluate whether they would be able to get a better product or if their requests are unreasonable or impossible to produce.

In response to the noted deficiencies in the current efforts and the interest from senior intelligence professionals in improving the relationship between the warfighter and the intelligence community, this paper proposes several alternatives that JICs could implement in an attempt to create a dynamic relationship to improve intelligence support to the warfighters. This paper uses a "Model Of Choice" framework to evaluate the proposed solutions based on the following criteria:

- 1) Improving the relationships between operators and intelligence producers.

This was chosen as one of the criteria because most senior military officers believe that the biggest problem inhibiting the JIC from fulfilling its role is the

relationship it has with the warfighter. 91 These officers believe that the support must be based on a dynamic interaction between intelligence producers and the warfighter.

2) Providing relevant proactive intelligence down to tactical units.

This was chosen as one of the criteria because most of the changes noted in this paper do not improve support below the JTF level.

3) Providing intelligence products in a usable format for tactical units.

This was chosen as the third criteria because the issue of products not being in a usable format as was noted during Desert Storm. As mentioned throughout this paper, the intelligence community has made a number of changes in its practices to provide more data to more places but very few attempts to make the data more usable to warfighters below the JTF level.

Creating the dynamic relationship that can meet the above criteria is a complex problem. Therefore, the "Model of Choice" framework for analysis is used to guide the reader through the decision making process, and open the analysis for evaluation and discussion. 92 Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser in their Primer for Policy Analysis claim that it is , "easier to keep track of where you are in [the] iterative process [of analysis]...if you keep in mind a basic framework to which every aspect of the analysis must be related." 93 The step-by-step "Model of Choice" framework thereby cuts a complex problem of decision making down into doable segments.

## CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

### Making A Decision

The applied decision-making method in this paper has by no means exhausted the myriad alternatives for improving the relationship between warfighters and intelligence producers, but clearly illustrates the "model of choice" process. The process demonstrates how the alternatives, currently untested at the JIC, would influence JIC support to the warfighter. The criteria chosen for this paper point to Operator-Intelligence teams as the best solution. Operator-Intelligence teams are the only alternative used in this paper that fulfill the three primary requirements of: (1) improving the relationships between operators and intelligence producers; (2) providing relevant proactive intelligence down to fighting forces; and (3) providing intelligence in a useable format. The SPEAR case study and the JICPAC initiative showed that this concept is successful at meeting the criteria mentioned above. Joint Vocational Training would improve only the relationship by having better trained JIC personnel. Knowledge of the other services and their functions may have a limited impact on the JIC providing intelligence down to fighting forces, but this knowledge will not help if the JIC does not know its customers. The Operations-Intelligence merger would definitely improve the relationship between operators and intelligence producers which could have a direct impact on providing the products in a useable format. However, as explained in Chapter 5, this merger would have very little impact below the theater and JTF level which is needed based on the third criterion above.

The model works well in the context of this paper because of the criteria that were set for choosing the best alternative. Although Operator-Intelligence teams meet the criteria for success as outlined in this paper they may not be fiscally viable in the current environment. This consideration does not invalidate the final preference choice of Operator-Intelligence Teams because the choice depends on the criteria used. If the intelligence community used the same criteria that was used in this paper, the solutions should be the same. However, the real world is imminently more complex with a number of additional variables and possible considerations.

In reality, the most likely solution in the near future will be the Operations-Intelligence merger.<sup>126</sup> This alternative does not meet the criteria outlined in this paper for improving support to warfighters below the JTF level, although, within the current real world environment the following two considerations may weigh in over the other more operational alternatives: 1) the merger does not require additional personnel or funding in order to implement the changes; 2) The merger is not as politically sensitive as making operators part of the intelligence effort. The use of the term "politically sensitive" in this paper, as so precisely defined by LCDR Dan Struble, USNR, in "Infrastructure, Installation, and the Future of the Navy," "...does not refer to personality-centered squabbles over who is advanced or who gets top positions. [Politically sensitive] here simply denotes the intradepartmental struggle to define how resources are to be allocated and controlled."<sup>127</sup> Although the merger will probably not drastically change support to forces below the JTF level as Operator-Intelligence teams would, the merger could be a move in the right direction for improving the relationship between the warfighter and the

intelligence community. An initial improvement such as the merger could lead to new initiatives causing the JICs to one day implement Operator-Intelligence teams in order to achieve the dynamic relationship needed to support warfighters below the JTF level.

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